Insider\u27s Liability Under Rule 10b-5 for the Illegal Purchase of Actively Traded Securities by Navin, William Henry
Insiders' Liability Under Rule 10b-5 for the
Illegal Purchase of Actively Traded
Securities
Civil liability for "insider trading" under SEC Rule 1 Ob-51 may soon
be greatly expanded. In the past, those claiming to have been injured
by an insider's silence were generally shareholders in closed corpora-
tions.2 As a result, no court has yet been faced with a private claim in
a case where the insider executed his illegal transaction on a national
stock exchange.3 But such claims are now pending. In an SEC action
against the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company,4 the Second Circuit found
that over a five-month period, eight of the company's officials violated
Rule lOb-5 by purchasing Texas Gulf stock on the open market with-
out disclosing material information. By the date of the District Court
opinion, at least forty-nine private actions had been brought to recover
a total of more than $75,000,000 in damages.5 Unless those actions are
settled, some court will soon face the difficult problem of defining the
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1942). The Rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mia-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1916), Judge Kirkpatrick
held that violators were civilly liable to those for whose benefit the Rule was enacted.
Since then, Rule lOb-5 has been one of the most rapidly-expanding areas of federal law.
2. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1964); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp.
128 (D. Md. 1968); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
3. See A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw: FLauD--SEC RuE lOb-5, § 8.5, at 208.1 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG].
4. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd in part,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). The facts of the case were rather complicated, and a full
summary would serve no useful purpose. In essence, the problem was that in November
1963 Texas Gulf personnel discovered what the Second Circuit later characterized as a
"more than marginal" possibility that the land near Timmins, Ontario, contained cop-
per, zinc and silver deposits of unprecedented size. The discovery was kept secret until
April 1964 so that the company could acquire the land at minimal expense. During those
five months, insiders and their "tippees" purchased considerable quantities of Texas
Gulf stock on various exchanges. The SEC sued for an injunction; and as ancillary re-
lief, it asked that the individual defendants be compelled to make restitution to those
whose shares they purchased. As of this writing, the case has been remanded to the
District Court for a determination of the appropriate remedies.
5. 258 F. Supp. at 267 n.l.
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proper scope of liability and measure of damages for insider trading on
an active market. 6
I. The Scope of Liability
The language used in some early decisions under Rule lOb-5 sug-
gested that violators were civilly liable only to those plaintiffs who
could establish privity of contract.7 This requirement seemed reason-
able enough in closed-corporation cases, where it was clear that the
only party who could have been injured was the person with whom
the defendant dealt. But in some cases, particularly those involving
listed securities, the defendants' misrepresentations reached the public
at large." Faced with plaintiffs who clearly relied on such statements,
the courts soon lost patience with the privity requirement, and by
now it can safely be said that the rule has been abandoned." Its aban-
donment seems wholly proper, since privity has little to recommend it
conceptually. If two plaintiffs sold for the same price at the same time,
it seems manifestly unfair to deny one a remedy while permitting
the other to recover, simply because the latter's stock certificates
happened to be the ones delivered to the insider.10
But the absence of a privity barrier makes it necessary to develop
some other means of limiting the scope of the insider's liability. Other-
wise, the offending insider would become an insurer of every investor's
market losses."1 This result is obviously unacceptable in theory, even
6. The following discussion makes no attempt to deal with cases involving affirmative
misrepresentations. However, the suggested analysis does apply to cosed-corporation. as
well as active-market cases; and although its specific concern is wuith purchases by in-
siders, the reasoning can be extrapolated to cover cases where the insider sold as well.
7. See, eg., Donovan Inc. v. Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 552, 553 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Joseph v.
Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), afl'd, 195
F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
8. See, e.g., Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Freed v.
Szabo Food Service, Inc., [1961-64 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RE. rj 91.317
(N.D. IIL. Jan. 14, 1964). In Miller, plaintiffs claimed to have purchased Bargain City
stock on the open market in reliance on misleading statements filed by the defendants
with the SEC. Defendants, who had not themselves been selling the stock, cited Joseph
v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). for the
proposition that some "semblance of privity' had to be shown. The court replied that
"if 'a semblance of privity' means 'privity' (like 'a little bit pregnant). I reject it."
Miller, supra, at 37.
9. See BROimERG § 8.5, at 205-06 & n.30; cf. IV. PAINTER, FEDERAL RECULATION OF5 IN-
smER TRADlwG 114-15 (1968).
10. See TAN 52 infra.
11. Comment, Civil Liability Under Section 10B and Rule lOb-5: A Suggestion for
Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YAL L.J. 658, 678 (1965), notes that once privity is
dropped, the absence of at least a causation requirement would mean that "there would
be no a priori reason to limit the class of possible plaintiffs to one group or another
since no one would have to allege a loss stemming from defendant's conduct. Any investor
who suffered a loss would make as good a plaintiff as any other, any limitation such as
contemporaneity with defendant's act would be wholly arbitrary."
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if the amount of the insider's liability were to be somehow restricted,
since it turns civil liability under the Rule into a penal, rather than
a remedial device. And in practice, the courts have consistently re-
jected any suggestion that insiders should be treated as insurers.
12
One possible limitation would be to require the plaintiff to prove
some form of reliance.13 This might be appropriate in misrepresenta-
tion cases, 14 or even in cases of nondisclosure, so long as the insider
dealt directly with the plaintiff. But when the insider made no repre-
sentation at all and had no direct contact with the plaintiff, a strict
insistence on reliance would grant him virtual immunity.', In effect, it
would mean that an insider could escape liability altogether merely
by dealing through an intermediary, a result that the Supreme Court
found intolerable sixty years ago in Strong v. Repide.'0
A closer reading of the cases purporting to require reliance reveals
that many courts were actually referring to the concept of causation in
fact. 17 It does seem proper to limit the defendant's liability to those
12. "[The aim of the rule . . . is to qualify, as between insiders and outsiders, the
doctrine of caveat emptor-not to establish a scheme of investors' insurance." List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir., 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (in
support of a reliance requirement); see Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 7,14.45 n.23 (8th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 US. 951 (1968).
13. Cf. Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 267-68 (1st Cir. 1966); Janigan v. Taylor,
344 F.2d 781, 786 (Ist Cir. 1965); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d
Cir. 1965).
14. But see W. PAINTER, supra note 9, at 109-10. Professor Painter suggests that a
strict reliance requirement is inappropriate even in cases of misrepresentation, since
misrepresentations can affect the market price of the stock, thus Injuring investors who
never heard of the misstatement just as much as those who relied on it.
15. Professor Painter notes that
the concept of "reliance" when applied to cases of nondisclosure that involve deal-
ings on an exchange or over-the-counter market is incongruous; the investor "relies"
only on his general impression of the financial condition of the corporation gleaned
from its published reports, or he relies on the general tendency of market quota-
tions to reflect the results of such reports; he does not rely on the "omission of an
individual whose identity is unknown to him."
W. PAINTER, supra note 9, at 109.
For that reason, one commentator argues that "focusing on reliance rather than causa-
tion prevents an accurate analysis of the nature of plaintiff's harm and its causal
relationship with defendant's conduct." Comment, supra note 11, at 674; see B1IDOniERt
§ 8.1, at 194-95.
16. 213 US. 419 (1909). There the Court held that because of the "special facts"-
apparently consisting in the defendant insider's dominant position in the corporation,
which gave him exclusive access to the information in question-he was liable to the
seller despite the fact that he concealed his identity by purchasing through a straw
man.
In List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), the court cited Strong
for the proposition that an insider can be liable even though he made no affirmative
representation at all, stating that "[slurely we would suppose that Rule l0b-5 Is as
stringent in this respect as the federal common law rule which preceded it."
17. The reliance test ordinarily permits the court to determine whether or not there
was a causal nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's loss. But re-
liance and causation will at times point in different directions, since either can exist
without the other. See Comment, supra note 11, at 672; W. PAINTER, supra note 9, at
103-12. When they do work at cross-purposes, courts ordinarily look to causation, even
though some may continue to use the term "reliance." See note 36 infra.
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injuries which, but for his illegal conduct, would never have been
suffered."" Any broader liability would be inconsistent with the policies
thought to justify the imposition of civil liability in the first place"'
Courts have developed three major rationales for the existence of
a private right of action under the Rule.-0 Two of them, the "tort"
and "policy" rationales, clearly preclude liability for injuries that the
defendant's conduct cannot be shown to have caused. The third, the
"voidability" rationale, is less dear; but insofar as it does conflict with
the first two, its application cannot be justified on any rational theory
of remedies.
A. The Tort and Policy Rationales
The most frequently cited rationale for civil libability under the
Rule is the "tort" doctrine.21 It derives from the common-law rule
that the violation of a criminal statute is tortious if (1) it results in an
injury of the sort that the statute was intended to prevent, and (2) the
injury was suffered by a member of the class that the statute was sup-
posed to protect.2 The doctrine is based, not on the premise that the
legislature must have intended a private right of recovery, but rather
18. More accurately, he should be liable only for those injuries that his offense sub-
stantially contributed to. See W. PRossER, THE LAw or Tours 244 (3d ed. 1964). But in
the vast majority of cases, the "but for" and "substantial factor" tests of causation lead
to the same result- Id.
19. See Comment, supra note 11, at 677.
20. Bromberg characterizes them as "statutory tort," "statutory policy" and "statutory
voidability." BosmBERG, § 2.4(1), at 27-34. He also mentions a fourth rationale, whicl he
terms "statutory implication," which argues from the general grant of jurisdiction to the
federal courts in Section 27 and the statute of limitations provided in Section 29(b) for
actions to avoid contracts with broker-dealers. Id. at 32-33. However, the Section 27 argu-
ment, at least as used by the courts, seems virtually indistinguishable fron the statutory
policy argument. Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). And insofar as the im-
plication theory rests on Section 29(b), it seems inseparable from the statutory voidability
rationale.
The following discussion occasionally refers to suits relying on the statutory tort and
statutory policy rationales as "implied actions," to distinguish them from suits for
rescission and restitution under Section 29(b). For the latter, see pp. 873-75 infra.
21. BRo.MBERG § 2A(l)(a), at 30.
22. The source primarily relied on by the courts during the formative erioad of civil
liability under the Rule was Section 286 of the REsrATEmEt&r or Touas (1939). That pro-
vision is given in full at p. 888 infra. A revised version appears in REsrATE.m-,r
(SEcoND) oF ToRrs § 286 (1965):
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the require-
ments of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is
found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is in-
vaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm
resulted.
As Bromberg notes, "[t]he new version is a much feebler basis for liability than the
old. But the liability theory is so firmly ensconced in 13b-5 jurisprudence that the later
Restatement is unlikely to have any effect on it." BRo~mERG § 2A(l)(a). at 30 n-57.
867
The Yale Law Journal
on the theory that "the right is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained
in the law that where it is not expressly denied the intention to with.
hold it should appear very clearly and plainly."2aa
If liability is based on the tort doctrine, the doctrine itself restricts
the insider's liability to those losses that he actually caused. Section 286
of the first Restatement of Torts, the provision relied on by virtually
every court that has employed the doctrine, states explicitly that the
violator of a criminal enactment is civilly liable for the invasion of
another's interests only if "the violation is a legal cause of the in-
vasion."
24
The "policy" rationale is much broader. It assumes that the courts
are charged with the duty of making remedial legislation like the
securities laws fully effective by supplying any necessary remedy that
Congress may have overlooked. 25 Although foreshadowed by lower court
opinions, 20 the doctrine was first articulated by the Supreme Court in
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak.27 There the Court held that a private action
lies under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act for injuries
suffered as a result of reliance on misleading proxy statements. Quoting
Bell v. Hood,28 the Court said that "[i]t is for the federal courts 'to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief' when federally
secured rights are invaded. '29
Even if the tort doctrine is abandoned in favor of the broad policy
rationale of Borak, causation in fact should still have to be alleged.
Under the latter rationale, the only real justification for civil liability
is that an injury resulting from illegal conduct would otherwise go
unremedied. If a court holds the defendant liable for an injury that did
not in fact result from his offense, the court is exceeding its authority
and in effect assessing criminal penalties without legislative guidance.
Borak may have authorized the judiciary to supply necessary remedies,
but a "remedy" in the absence of a loss caused by the wrongdoer is
23. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (ED. Pa. 1946). Kardon
was the first lOb-5 case to recognize a private right of recovery.
24. RStATEiENT ov ToATS § 286(d) (1939). Section 9, Comment b, states that "In
order that a particular act or omission may be the legal cause of an invasion of anotler's
interest, the act or omission must [inter alia] be a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm ...."
It should also be noted that at common law deceit was not even actionable unless the
plaintiff could allege actual damages. 1 F. HARPEa & F. JAMES, Tnm LAw OF TORTs § 7.15,
at 590-91 (1956); PROSSER, supra note 18, at 747-48.
25. See BROMBERG § 2.4(1)(d), at 33-34.
26. E.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); Fratt v, Robinson, 203 F.2d
627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953); cf. Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1944) (Clark,
J., dissenting on another point).
27. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
28. 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
29. 377 U.S. at 433.
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simply a fine, levied in a particularly pernicious ex post facto manner.
Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act itself provides that "no
person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions
of this chapter shall recover.. . a total amount in excess of his actu,-d
damages on account of the act complained of."30 Two recent cases have
questioned the section's applicability to implied actions under the
Rule, on the theory that the right of action arises from common law,
rather than under the provisions of the Act.3' But the prevailing
opinion seems to be that Section 28(a) does apply.32 If so, "on account
of the act complained of" might reasonably be interpreted as restricting
recovery to plaintiffs whose asserted injuries were demonstrably caused
"by the act complained of." 33
B. Causation in the Context of Insider Trading
In past cases, sellers have experienced relatively little difficulty in
convincing the trier of fact that their losses were in fact caused by the
insider's offense. But their burdens were lightened considerably by a
fundamental misconception on the part of most courts as to what
"causation in fact" means in the context of insider trading.
List v. Fashion Park, Inc.34 furnishes an illustration. There the
plaintiff claimed that insiders bad purchased his stock without dis-
closing an impending sale of the corporation's assets. The District
Court found for the defendants, citing two alternative grounds. First, it
held that the information withheld was not material, since negotiations
for the asset sale had barely begun when defendants purchased
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1964).
31. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (dictum, in
response to an argument that the section barred punitive damages); Baumel v. Rosen,
283 F. Supp. 128, 145 (D. Md. 1968) (in response to an argument that the section limits
defrauded purchasers to the measure of damages used for deceit at common law).
Bromberg recognizes the possibility that the section may not govern implied actions,
but concludes that it "probably does." BROMBRG_ § 8.7(1), at 213 n.59.
As an alternative possibility, Baurnel suggested that the section might be interpreted
"as simply precluding double recovery for common law fraud and violation of rederal
law." 283 F. Supp. at 145; accord, 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrrms PLEuLxano.o 1474 n.105 (2d ed.
1961). But even if that interpretation is correct, the same considerations that militate
against double recoveries would seem to preclude even a single recovery when the de-
fendant's offense was not the cause in fact of the asserted injury.
32. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748 (8th Cir. 1967); Estate Counseling
Service v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir.
1962); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1962), al'd, 319 F.2d 634
(7th Cir. 1963).
33. But see BRoMlBERG § 8.7(1), at 213 n.59, where the author notes that "'on account
of' is a relatively loose connective; Congress might easily have written 'caused by in-
stead."
Some courts have suggested that the section's only function is to prohibit punitive
damages. E.g., MAyzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748 (8th Cir. 1967). However, any liability
for injuries not caused is arguably "punitive."
34. 227 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aJJ'd, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965). cert. denied.
382 U.S. 811 (1965).
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plaintiff's stock. Second, it held that plaintiff was too sophisticated an
investor to have relied on defendant's disclosure. The Second Circuit
affirmed, but it rejected the lower court's interpretation of the reliance
requirement. Instead, it proposed that
[t]he proper test is whether the plaintiff would have been in-
fluenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had
disclosed to him the undisclosed fact. .... This test preserves the
common law parallel between "reliance" and "materiality," dif-
fering as it does from the definition of "materiality" under Rule
10b-5 solely by substituting the individual plaintiff for the rea-
sonable man.3 5
As a test of causation in fact, which, in context, it clearly purported
to be 3 . the List formula is misleading in the extreme. But the courts,
and even a number of commentators, have accepted it without ques-
tion,37 and it seems destined to create serious problems when an active-
market case arises.
The formula's basic defect is its implicit assumption that insiders are
subject to an unconditional duty of disclosure. Because of that assump-
tion, the critical question is thought to be whether or not, had dis-
closure been made, the plaintiff would still have sold for the price he
received. But in fact, as the Second Circuit itself has since recognized,
if an insider stays out of the market and refrains from recommending
his company's stock to others, he retains what appears to be an absolute
right to keep material information secret. 38 This right derives from the
language of the Rule itself. The "manipulative and deceptive devices"
listed in the Rule's three numbered clauses are illegal only if practiced
35. 340 F.2d at 463.
36. Throughout the opinion, the court spoke in terms of reliance, but it noted that
the function of the reliance requirement was "to certify that the conduct of the de-
fendant actually caused the plaintiff's injury." Id. at 462. Shortly thereafter, it commented
that "[a]ssuredly, to abandon the requirement of reliance would be to facilitate outsiders'
proof of insiders' fraud, and to that extent . . .might advance the purposes of Rule
lOb-5. But this strikes us as an inadequate reason for reading out of the rule so basic
an element of tort law as the principle of causation in fact . I..." Id. at 463.
37. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735, 744-45 n.23, 749 (8th Cir. 1967); Ross
v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Taylor v. Janigan, 230 F. Supp. 858, 859
(D. Mass. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965); Fleischer, Securities Trading and
Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding,
51 VA. L. Rav. 1271, 1298-99 (1965); W. PAINTER, supra note 9, at 111-12, 115-16 &
passim.
38. "[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose It
to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a
corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recoin-
mending the securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed."
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (emphasis added); see
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
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"in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security."' 0 The courts
have interpreted the "in connection with" requirement liberally, par-
ticularly in cases where the defendant was accused of making a positive
misrepresentation,40 but no court has ever held that the Rule was
violated by mere failure to disclose when neither the insider nor any
party privy to the insider bought or sold a security.
4'
The fact that an insider ordinarily retains the option of silence means
that what the court should have been asking in List was whether the
plaintiff would have sold if defendants had refrained from trading, not
whether he would have sold if defendants had disclosed. Assuming
that defendants had in fact violated the Rule, the plaintiff should have
been able to recover only if, but for the defendants' willingness to
purchase, he would have retained his stock until news of the asset sale
39. The placement of the "in connection with" clause at the end of l0b-5(c) might
seem to indicate that the practices prohibited by the first two clauses need not meet
that test. However, no court has yet made such a suggestion; and if the Rule were to be
so construed, it might well be ultra vires.
40. See Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co., CCH FED. Sac. L. REt,. , 92_272 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). There the defendants delivered an allegedly misleading speech to a group of
security analysts, hoping to induce them to recommend their employer's securities. The
court held that it was unnecessary to allege that the misleading speech was delivered
for the purpose of improving defendants' own market position, so long as plaintiffs did
allege reliance. See also Miller v. Bargain City, USA., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964)
(decision on whether or not the "in connection with" requirement was satisfied where
defendants filed allegedly misleading reports with the SEC. Nithout engaging in any
transactions themselves, would have been premature on motion to dismiss).
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-62 (1968), the Second Circuit
held that good faith and an absence of corporate advantage were no defense to an SEC
injunction action if the corporation had failed to exercise due diligence in preparing
an important press release. However, it found it unnecessary to decide whether such a
negligent failure would ground an action for damages. Id. at 663; accord, Heit v.
Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), petition for cert. filed, 37 US.L.W. 3250 (US. Jan.
2, 1969) (No. 894).
41. But see Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). There one of the
defendants was an accounting firm which the plaintiffs accused of having remained
silent after discovering that its client's last annual report was materially misleading. The
court refused to decide on motion whether or not the "in connection with" requirement
was satisfied in the absence of any obvious gain. However, it was also alleged that the
firm had encouraged its employer to distribute uncertified interim reports after discovering
the crucial error, and the court treated the case in part. at least, as one where the
defendant aided and abetted the primary violation of the employer. But here. too, as
in Miller v. Bargain City, US-A., 229 F. Supp. 33 (ED. Pa. 1964), there was no specific
allegation that the primary defendants were buying or selling securities.
In theory, it might seem arbitrary to condition liability on whether or not an insider
(or a tippee) actually bought or sold stock. Investors can be harmed by any failure to
make immediate disclosure of material information: and insiders can cause considerable
damage by malicious or negligent delay, whether or not they themselves profit from it.
But secrecy is essential to the proper exploitation of most innovations and discoveries.
Texas Gulf is a ready example. If the "in connection with" requirement is found to
have been satisfied without insider trading, as such, the door is open to judicial scrutiny
of every corporate decision to keep something secret. The resulting exposure, even if
limited to the possibility of an injunction, could exert undesirable pressure on managers
making decisions that should be purely matters of business judgment. The retention of
a trading requirement lets corporate officers make business decisions without fear of
judicial second-guessing, so long as they remain silent and stay out of the market.
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became public. If he would have sold before that date anyway, the in-
siders' offense bore no causal relationship to his loss.
Even though the court asked the wrong question in List, it probably
reached the right result. For under the suggested test, proof of causa-
tion would still be relatively easy in closed-corporation cases and in cases
where the insider actively solicited the sale. But where the stock in
question was highly liquid and the seller spoke only to his broker, his
burden of proof is formidable.
The problem is not, as some commentators have suggested, that no
one can be harmed by insider trading on a stock exchange.42 Investors
as a class are always harmed by insider trading.43 The real problem is
that in stock exchange cases the injured parties are likely to be un-
identifiable: there is usually no way of knowing who would have held
the stock at the time of disclosure had the insider not entered the
market.
If investors all made their decisions to buy or sell without reference
to the price of the stock, the only people who could legitimately claim
to have been injured by insider purchases would be those buyers who
were forced to pay a marginally higher price by competition from the
insiders. 44 But most investors do look at a stock's price before selling,
and if an insider's purchases were solely responsible for a rise in the
stock's price to the level at which an investor intended to sell, the
insider in a very real sense caused the sale.4" In practice, this means
42. See Comment, supra note 11, at 675-76, 679; Whitney, Section [Sic] .b-5: From
Cady, Roberts to Texas Gulf: Matters of Disclosure, 21 Bus. LAW. 193, 201-03 (1965);
Cf. H. MANNE, INSmER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET ch. 7 (1966); BROMBEG § 8,7(2),
at 217.
43. Comment, Insider Trading Without Disclosure-Theory of Liability, 28 O1o ST.
L.J. 472, 477 (1967), notes that whenever insider trading takes place, "the aggregate
quantity of good securities owned by investors is diminished, or the quantity of losing
stock in the hands of investors is increased."
44. See Whitney, supra note 42, at 201.
45. If the market effects of insider purchasing dissuaded a person from buying the
relevant stock, that person was injured just as much as any seller. In practice, however,
frustrated purchasers would have to find some way to circumvent the many cases
holding that only actual purchasers and sellers have standing to sue under the Rule.
See Hambro's Bank, Ltd. v. Meserole, 287 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Greenstein v.
Paul, 275 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968): Chaschln v.
Menscher, 255 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump
Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 235 (SDN.Y.
1964), aff'd, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 98 F. Supp.
506 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
Recent cases have begun to "whittle away" at the buyer-seller requirement. BROMBERG
§ 8.8, at 222.1; see Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Entel v. Allen,
270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); cf. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
Nonetheless, even if a frustrated purchaser can sue under the Rule, the problems of
proving that he would in fact have bought but for the insider's offense are such that
his rights are of theoretical interest only. Like the seller, he has to prove that the
insider's transaction had a measurable effect on the market and that he reacted to that
effect. The task is difficult enough for a seller; but for a buyer, proof of reaction would
be virtually impossible.
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that private recoveries in active-market cases, although infrequent,
may occur when sellers can show that (1) the insider's purchases had a
measurable effect on the market, and (2) they sold when they did as a
direct result of that effect.
Yet when the stock in question was the subject of heavy trading
during the relevant period, it would probably be impossible for a
seller to establish causation.40 The result is admittedly incongruous.
A realistic causation in fact requirement, without which no rational
limitation on the scope of the insider's liability is possible, has the effect
of denying recovery to the very class that the Securities Exchange Act
was specifically designed to protect: investors trading on national
stock exchanges. Commentators have suggested that this result might
be avoided by appropriate presumptions-for example, a presumption
that any sale executed during the approximate period in which insid-
ers were buying was caused by the insiders.47 But no presumption
could make it substantially easier for a seller to recover without being
grossly contrary to fact and thus eliminating the rationality of the
causation in fact test.
C. Causation and the Voidability Doctrine
The third major rationale for civil liability under the Rule is the
"voidability" theory. Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
provides:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chap-
ter or any rule or regulation thereunder ... shall be void (1) as
regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such
provision, rule or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the
performance of any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of
any person who, not being a party to such contract, shall have
acquired any rights thereunder with actual knowledge of the
facts by reason of which the making or performance of any such
contract was in violation of any such provision, rule or regula-
tion.48
Taken literally, it gives any person capable of showing that his shares
were the ones purchased by the insider an unconditional option to
avoid the contract of sale and demand restitution,4 while those un-
46. Cf. BRoimERG § 8.7(2), at 216. Professor Bromberg concludes that a strict insistence
on causation would in most instances immunize insiders from civil liability entirely, and
for that reason suggests that some "middle ground" must be found; but he makes no
serious attempt at proposing one. Id. at 220.
47. See, e.g., BR MBERG § 8.7(2), at 219 g- n.87. But see note 11 supra.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1964).
49. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 1793. Read literally, the section characterizes
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able to do so are relegated to an implied action and subjected to the
burden of proving causation in fact.
Ordinarily the discrimination is innocuous. A seller will usually
be unable to recover under Section 29(b) unless he could have shown
causation in fact, for in order to avoid the contract he has to establish
that it was "made in violation of" Rule lOb-5. In misrepresentation
cases, that should mean that the seller has to prove he relied on the
buyer's misstatement.60 And even in nondisclosure cases, so long as the
stock in question was closely held, its lack of liquidity would ordi-
narily make it unlikely that the seller would have sold anyway if the
insider had not wanted to buy. But in active-market cases, the literal
language of Section 29(b) lets sellers demand restitution when the
insider's offense bore no causal relationship at all to the sale."1 Brom-
berg notes that "[t]hose in unwitting privity with the buyers have no
greater claim than others trading about the same time,"' 2 yet those
who traded at about the same time neither have nor should have any
claim at all unless they can establish that the insider actually caused
their sales.
Irrational as Section 29(b) may seem when juxtaposed with the
rules governing implied actions, there appears to be no really satis-
factory way of avoiding its application. One possibility would be to
interpret it as a statutory analogue to the common-law rule that con-
tracts tainted by fraud in the inducement are voidable.5a It would
contracts in violation of SEC rules as "void." In practice, however, the courts have In-
terpreted it as rendering them voidable only, at the option of the "defrauded" party.
The Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 792 (8th Cir. 1967); Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 215 (9th Cir. 1962).
The option is unconditional in the sense that proof of sale appears to be the only
legal requisite for rescission. However, it can be lost by laches, waiver and estoppeh
Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, supra, at 213-14; cf. Straley v. Universal Uranium &
Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961). And the remedy, as distinguished from the
right itself, can be barred by the running of the applicable statute of limitations. Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, supra, at 214.
50. The alternative-voiding all transactions whether or not the other party was
affected by the misrepresentation-could be justified only as a penalty. Arguably, the
section operates as a penalty anyway in nondisclosure cases, but that result, unlike the
alternative noted above, is apparently compelled by the plain language of the statute.
In misrepresentation cases, its language is loose enough to give the court a choice.
51. It might be thought that the "actual damages" rule of Section 28(a) bars any
recovery, even under Section 29(b), by plaintiffs unable to establish causation in fact.
However, even if Section 28(a) does govern implied actions, a matter of some doubt, see
p. 869 9: note 31 supra, plaintiffs suing under Section 29(b) are demanding restitution,
not maintaining "a suit for damages," and that would seem to render the former section
inapplicable on its face. See BROMaERG § 8.7(1), at 213 n.59.
52. BROMBERG § 8.7(2), at 218.
53. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476(1) (1932).
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then be appropriate to require that the plaintiff show that his sale
was in fact induced by the insider's "fraud"-i.e., his presence in
the market during a period of nondisclosure. The problem with that
interpretation is that the language of the statute contains no warrant
for it. Purchases by insiders in possession of undisclosed material in-
formation are certainly "in violation of" Rule lOb-5, irrespective of
whether they actually hurt anyone.A5
Admittedly, the mechanical problems of matching transactions
executed on an active exchange may be such that the possibility of
frequent windfall recoveries under Section 29(b) is more theoretical
than real.55 Still, so long as civil liability under the Rule is supposed
to be remedial rather than penal, the section will remain an unfor-
tunate anomaly, and one that should be excised in any future over-
haul of the Act.
II. Measure of Damages
The burden of showing that a sale was in fact caused by an insider's
illegal market activity is so formidable that a discussion of the dam-
ages to which successful plaintiffs are entitled may seem to be of
academic interest only. Nonetheless, unusual cases do arise, and parts
of the following analysis are relevant to all insider trading cases, not
just to active-market situations.
A. The Insider's Maximum Liability
Under present law, the extent of an insider's potential liability can
be grossly disproportionate to the magnitude of his offense.'; If the
courts extend the List formula to stock exchange cases, every investor
who sold the relevant stock between the inception of insider trading
and the date of disclosure would be a potential plaintiff. All that
List requires is a finding that the plaintiff would have acted differently
if the insider had made full disclosure. That means that if the in-
54. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (1967). Another possible means of avoiding
the literal application of Section 29(b) would be to read "contracts" as meaning "ecu-
tory contracts," thus limiting the "voidability" doctrine to those few cases in which tie
fraud is discovered before the sale is completed, on the theory that the legislature .- as
endorsing the common-law rule that a knowing party to an illegal contract has no right
to enforce it. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNrRhAcrs § 598 (1932). However, any such endorse-
ment would have been supererogatory, and the legislature could easily have said
"executory" if that was what it meant.
55. See Fleischer, supra note 40, at 1297 n.126.
56. This assumes that the magnitude of the offense is measured by the number of
shares purchased or the amount of the insider's net profit.
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formation withheld was in fact material, the insider's liability is
virtually a foregone conclusion.57
Some commentators have suggested that an insider's potential
liability is so "frightening,""8  especially in comparison with the
culpability of his offense, that in stock exchange cases, at least, private
plaintiffs as a class should be allowed to recover no more than an
amount equal to the insider's "profits."5 9 But any such limitation on
the insider's liability would create serious definitional problems.
Since the beginning of civil liability under the Rule, courts have in-
sisted that gain is no prerequisite for liability.°0 As long as that
doctrine continues to be applied in "non-market" cases, questions
will arise as to which category the case at hand should be placed in.
57. The only possible defense would be to plead that even though a reasonable
investor would have changed his mind, the plaintiff would not have. The prospects for
success with an argument like that are dim.
Painter, who appears to accept the List test, is forced to admit that "there seems to
be no rational means of deciding who, among those trading through the vastly impersonal
medium of an exchange or over-the-counter market, should recover and who should not."
PAINTER, supra note 9, at 112. As a result, he concludes that
[t]he boundless scope of potential liability, by a class action or otherwise, is enough
to make the whole question of civil liability in this area controversial. For failing to
disclose relevant information during the course of a single transaction in which he
purchased a limited number of shares, an insider could become virtually an insurer
of the future losses suffered by all who sold at about the same time. If several
purchases were made, the extent of liability on a per share basis would correspond
with the volume of trading during the period in question. If Section 16(b) has been
criticized as being 'arbitrary' and 'penal,' an application of Section 10(b) in the
manner suggested above would be nothing short of confiscatory.
Id. 125.
58. Id. 111; see, e.g., BROMBERG § 8.7(2), at 220.
59. Id. 218, 220 n.92 (noting, however, that in "very willful instances" liability
might properly be measured by the losses suffered by individual investors). Bromberg
asserts that "it]he net loss [to investors as a class] is, of course, equal to ti violators'
gain or profit and coincides with a fiduciary measure of damages." BRolsarGs § 8.7(2), at
218. Then, however, he adds in a footnote that "[i]n theory the calculation wotld be
easy: the difference between the prices paid . . . by the violators, and what they would
have been with disclosure and without misstatement." Id. at 218 n.80.
The two statements are contradictory. If a fiduciary measure of damages were applied,
the insider would be stripped of any profits made by virtue of the illegal purchase. This
would mean that if the shares increased in value after disclosure, the insider would be
liable for the increase. Alternatively, if he sold after disclosure and invested the proceeds
in another stock, a court of equity could decree an accounting and apply equitable
tracing. Obviously the "gain or profit" thus measured would approximate Use net loss
to investors as a class (see p, 877 & note 63 infra) only on the dubious assumption that
those who would otherwise have been holding the insider's shares on the date of
disclosure would subsequently have made the same investment decisions as the insider.
If, on the other hand, the deceit measure suggested in the footnote were applied,
some parity would be achieved, since the insider's paper profits do approximate the
paper losses of investors as a class. But see p. 889-90 infra.
60. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 750 (8th Cir. 1967); Kardon v, National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947); cf. Sprayregen v. Livingston O11 Co.,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,272, at 97,310 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 25, 1968); Miller v. Bargain
City, U.S.A., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (implied), But see Fischer v. Klctz, 266 Fr,
Supp. 180, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where the court described the question of whether or
not gain was necessary as "interesting" but refused to dismiss because of its apparent
absence.
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Since the difference between "market" and "non-market" cases is
merely one of degree, turning on how actively the particular stock was
traded, close cases could be decided only by an arbitrary determina-
tion of whether or not the defendant's potential liability was "fright-
ening" enough to justify applying the limitation.
Even under the test of causation suggested above, the insider's
potential liability can vastly exceed the amount of his illegal profits.
When an insider purchases stock in an active market, the extent of
the resulting injury to investors will not necessarily be determined
by the number of shares he bought. If he buys enough stock to affect
the quoted price, the magnitude of the resulting damage will depend
solely on the market's reaction to the change. For example, the man-
agement of a mutual fund might have decided early in April 1964 to
liquidate ten thousand shares of Texas Gulf as soon as the price
reached thirty-five.61 If Texas Gulf reached thirty-five on April 15,
the day before the Timmins discovery was disclosed, solely because
an insider had purchased five hundred shares that morning, the fund
could legitimately charge the insider with responsibility for the sale
of all ten thousand.
62
But under the suggested test, the problem of disproportionate
liability is largely theoretical. Although the insider's potential liability
still exceeds the amount of his gains, the plaintiff's problems of proof
are such that the potentiality would rarely, if ever, be realized.
A limitation on the insider's maximum liability might be thought
to be justified by the fact that in any case where the insider caused
the sale of more shares than he bought, the sellers' losses were partially
balanced by the profits realized by innocent buyers, who purchased
only because the insider's offense had the effect of increasing the sup-
ply of shares on the market.6 3 But those who gained are unidentifi-
able; and even if they could be identified, it seems highly unlikely
that any seller could recover from them. Someone has to bear the con-
sequent loss; and the insider, whose wrongdoing caused it in the first
place, seems by far the most appropriate candidate.
In short, if a realistic causation in fact test is applied, there seems
61. The prices used here are fictional.
62. This assumes that the fund would have revalued Texas Gulf once it learned of
the Timmins discovery and waited at least until the market digested the news before
selling. If it would have sold at thirty-five anyway, obviously the insider bore no
responsibility for the fund's failure to profit from disclosure.
63. The case of the mutual fund furnishes an example. If the insider purchased only
five hundred shares, his offense had the effect of shifting the profits on ninety-five
hundred from the fund to other innocent investors.
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to be no real justification, theoretical or practical, for limiting an in-
sider's potential liability to the amount of his profits.
B. The Plaintiff's Maximum Recovery
In the few cases involving insider purchases that have reached the
relief stage, courts have been more interested in depriving defendants
of ill-gotten gains than in compensating sellers for credible losses.
The only consistent pattern emerging from the case law is that re-
gardless of circumstances, the insider will be deprived of an amount
equal to or exceeding any "profit" he might have made.
1. The Case Law
Speed v. Transamerica Corp.o4 was the first case in which the prob-
lem of damages was given any detailed consideration. Transamerica,
the owner of a majority of the voting stock of Axton-Fisher Tobacco
Company, made a tender offer to the minority without disclosing
that Axton-Fisher's tobacco inventory had been grossly undervalued in
the last annual report and that Transamerica planned to liquidate the
enterprise in the near future. Most of them accepted. On the date
of liquidation, warehouse receipts for the tobacco in storage were
distributed to Transamerica and the few minority holdouts. The
latter sold their receipts shortly thereafter to a buyer that Trans.
america found for them, but Transamerica held on to its own receipts
and eventually sold at an even greater profit.
The stockholders who had accepted Transamerica's tender offer
brought suit under Rule 10b-5. The court held that a disinterested
board of directors would have disclosed the value of the inventory
and the liquidation plans, and that plaintiffs would never have ac-
cepted the offer in that event. Having lost on the issue of liability,
Transamerica argued that damages should be measured under the
"deceit" or "out-of-pocket" rule, by calculating the difference between
the price paid by Transamerica and "the value of the stock at the
time when the fraud occurred, presuming a public knowledge of
the additional value of the inventory and of the fact of imminent
liquidation." 5
Evidence was introduced to show that the stock's value at the time
of the fraud, even presuming full disclosure, would have been con-
siderably less than the amount Transamerica eventually received for
64. 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947), 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), 135 F. Supp. 176
(D. Del. 1955), aff'd with modification of interest allowed, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
65. 135 F. Supp. at 191.
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the tobacco, but the court rejected the suggested measure entirely""
and purported to rely instead on the principles of Section 151 of the
Restatement of Restitution.67 As a result, the plaintiffs found them-
selves in an even better position than that of the stockholders who
had refused Transamerica's offer.
Had plaintiffs received their warehouse receipts upon the liquida-
tion . . . , it is impossible to say whether they would have ac-
cepted the offer which defendant arranged for the other public
stockholders, or whether they would, as did defendant, have
held them for a better price. The Restatement ... considers that
the defrauded party is "entitled to be put in substantially the
position [in which] he would have been had there not been the
deprivation" and it then goes on to recognize that "this may
result in granting to him an amount equal to the highest value
reached by the subject matter within a reasonable time after the
tortious conduct." What this highest value became within a rea-
sonable time after the liquidation does not appear in this record.
Nevertheless, within what I consider a reasonable time defendant
itself sold the warehouse receipts at a substantially higher price
than that received by the public stockholders. In the circum-
stances, it would, I think, be a curious decision of an appellate
court which specified that the damages payable to the defrauded
party were to be measured in value at the time of the liquidation
when plaintiffs were by the act of the defendant deprived of the
opportunity to gamble on future prices, and to permit the tort-
feasor itself, who deprived them of that right, to take the gamble
successfully and to retain the proceeds which resulted from it.0n
In dictum, the court went even further, stating that if Transamerica
had profitably invested the proceeds from the sale of tobacco attrib-
utable to plaintiff's shares, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to
a proportionate share of the investment as well.A6
Although the court claimed to be following the Restatement, it
drastically reduced the plaintiffs burden of proof. Under the Restate-
ment, the plaintiff could claim the value of the property at a date
66. The court's rejection seemed to be in part on theoretical grounds, and in part a
reflection of its doubt as to the strength of the defendant's evidence.
ifihere is a certain incongruity in an argument which speaks of undenied testimony
given in behalf of the defendant when the experience of tie defendant t.ef,
perhaps in the exercise of rare good judgment, perhaps as a result of good fortune.
or again, perhaps for a variety of reasons, is itself the effective denial of the testi-
mony of its own witnesses, in that it was able to cash in for itself afterwards several
times the value which its witnesses gave as of the dates when te fraud was com-
mitted.
Id.
67. See pp. 886-87 infra.
68. 135 F. Supp. at 192-93.
69. Id. at 196.
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subsequent to the fraud only if he could "prove" that he probably
would have sold it at that time.7 0 In Speed, however, the court ad-
mitted that it was impossible to predict whether or not plaintiffs
would have accepted the offer arranged for the other stockholders,
and still gave them the benefit of the doubt.
Almost ten years later, the First Circuit reached an identical result
in Janigan v, Taylor.71 Janigan, the manager of a closed corporation,
bought up virtually all of its shares for $20,00 each without disclos-
ing that the business was beginning to look profitable. Two years
later, he sold out for $300.00 per share. The sellers sued for an ac-
counting. Janigan argued that there was no way of knowing whether
or not they would have held on to the stock for as long as he did, to
which the District Court replied:
There is no merit in defendant's oft-repeated contention that
the accounting remedy necessarily involves the court's dealing with
the conjectural proposition what would plaintiffs have done had
the facts been known to them. On the contrary, I rule that be-
cause Janigan's fraud was successfully perpetrated on the plain-
tiffs and because he achieved his desired purpose of terminating
their ownership .... he cannot now be heard to say that plain-
tiffs are to be penalized because they are unable to show what
course they would have followed with reference to the stock at
a time after they had parted with ownership of it as a result of his
successful perpetration of a deliberate fraud on them."
In affirming, the First Circuit took substantially the same position
but appeared to be more concerned with the unjust enrichment of the
defendant than the injury to the plaintiff, It admitted that in cases
where the defendant was a seller rather than a buyer, the correct
measure of damages was the out-of-pocket rule, but flatly declined to
employ that rule in an insider-purchase case.
[If] the property is not bought from, but sold to, the fraudulent
party, future accretions not foreseeable at the time of the transfer
even on the true facts, and hence speculative, are subject to an-
other factor, viz., that they accrued to the fraudulent party. It
may, as in the case at bar, be entirely speculative whether, had
plaintiffs not sold, the series of fortunate occurrences would have
happened in the same way, and to their same profit. However,
there can be no speculation but that defendant actually made the
profit and, once it is found that he acquired the property by fraud,
70. See pp. 886-87 infra.
71. 344 F.2d 781 (Ist Cir. 1965).
72. 230 F. Supp. 858, 859 (D. Mass. 1964).
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that the profit was the proximate consequence of the fraud,
whether foreseeable or not. It is more appropriate to give the de-
frauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraud-
ulent party keep them .... We may accept defendant's position
that there was no fiduciary relationship and that he was dealing
at arm's length. Nonetheless, it is simple equity that a wrong-
doer should disgorge his fraudulent enrichment.
73
Thus Janigan made explicit what was only suggested in Speed: even
though a plaintiff is unable to establish that he would have made the
same profit as the insider, the insider still has to surrender that profit
to the plaintiff.74
Two recent cases have modified the position taken in Speed and
Janigan. In Myzel v. Fields,75 on facts similar to those in Janigan,"
M
the district judge instructed the jury that the minimum amount
recoverable would be the difference between the price paid by the
defendants and the "actual value" of the stock at the time of the
fraud, which could be determined by considering "all the circum-
stances," including the corporation's subsequent history. If the jury
found that plaintiffs would still have sold when they did, but at a
higher price, had defendants made full disclosure,
77 then plaintiffs
were entitled to the difference between that higher price and the
actual sale price. If, on the other hand, the plaintiffs would probably
have retained their stock as an investment, the jury was to award
the difference between the value of the stock at the end of a "reason-
able period" and the sale price. The only guidelines in determining
what period was "reasonable" were the limiting principles that (1) the
Act was not intended to "provide investors with an insurance policy
against market changes," and (2) violators should nonetheless not
be allowed to profit from their wrongdoing.
78
The jury awarded considerably less than it might have, and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed without trying to reconstruct its thought
processes.79 The court made no attempt to develop a generally ap-
plicable theory of damages for insider purchase cases. Instead, it was
73. 344 F.2d at 786.
74. Fleischer, supra note 37, at 1297-98, cites Janigan as support for the proposition
that "a primary purpose of rule lOb-5 is to deter improper insider trading,' and that
the SEC may therefore properly demand full disgorgement in an enforcement proceeding
like Texas Gulf.
75. 886 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
76. Defendant insiders purchased stock from plaintiffs, minority shareholders, without
disclosing favorable business developments. They also made positive misrepresentations to
some of the plaintiffs.
77. The court apparently assumed that the List test of causation was appropriate.
78. 386 F.2d at 744-45 n.23.
79. Id. at 743.
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content to find precedent in the common law for each of the District
Court's instructions. The result was confusing in the extreme. At
one point, the court stated that the contract of sale was void ab initio
by virtue of Section 29(b), and that since the shares were no longer
in existence, the plaintiffs were entitled to "recisional damages. 8 1'
At another, it quoted Janigan with approval."' Yet the instructions it
upheld limited the maximum recovery to the value of the stock within
a reasonable time after the fraud, whereas Janigan's accounting, or
the "recisional damages" suggested by Section 29(b), would presum-
ably have given plaintiffs an amount equal to the stock's value at the
time of the judgment. Elsewhere, however, the court noted that the
proper measure of damages would vary from case to case,82 and it
cited Section 151 of the Restatement for the proposition that restitu-
tionary damages are available only when the plaintiff can prove that
he would have sold the property at the relevant time.8 3 In any event,
Myzel's authority as precedent is limited, since the court implied
strongly that its decision might have been different on slightly vari-
ant facts.
8 4
In Baumel v. Rosen,85 defendants were the controlling stockholders
and managers of Gulf American Land Company. In 1959, when the
corporation's shares were still closely held, they persuaded plaintiffs
to sell their minority interests by intimating that the business was
less than sound and concealing material facts. Plaintiffs, presumably
hoping for a liberal interpretation of Section 151, asked for restitu-
tion of the stock plus damages in an amount equal to the difference
between the stock's value on the date of judgment and the highest
value it had reached since the date of the sale. Defendants argued
for an out-of-pocket measure, which, according to the court, would
have resulted in no recovery at all, since the plaintiffs had failed to
80. Id. at 741-42.
81. Id. at 747.
82. Id. at 743.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 749:
Although the trial court fashioned and submitted to the jury a remedy for theparticular facts, we fail to see any prejudice to appellants. The damages givenessentially reflect a proper measure of damages for deceit based upon an unknown
fluctuating value of stock of a dosed corporation under the particular circumstances
surrounding the case. The trial court was faced with great difficulty in instructing
upon these issues and did an excellent job. His approach on instructions was fair
to the appellants under the circumstances prevailing.
(Emphasis in original.)
85. 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968).
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introduce evidence regarding the "fair value" of the stock at the
time of the sale.86
Taking an intermediate position, the court ordered that the stock
be restored (or that defendants pay money damages in an amount
sufficient to let plaintiffs replace the stock themselves by purchasing
on the market)87 on the ground that any other decision might result
in "great injustice,"88 but it denied plaintiffs any additional dam-
ages:
Had plaintiffs elected to press their optional right to money
damages, rather than the specific return of personal property,
plaintiffs would have been entitled to money damages at least
for accretions in value within a reasonable time after they dis-
covered or had reason to know of defendants' tortious conduct
[citing the Restatement of Torts] . . . , or to its highest value
reached within a reasonable time after the tortious conduct
[citing the Restatement of Restitution] . . .The Court does
not believe that plaintiffs are entitled to both, especially where
plaintiffs offered no evidence to show that they would have sold
their stock when it reached its highest value 
.... so
Viewed purely as a remedial decision, Baumel could be justified only
on the dubious theory that the court felt it safe to assume plaintiffs
would have retained their stock from 1959 to 1968.
0 A much more
likely explanation is that here, as in Speed and Janigan, the court
used civil liability to punish the insider. It took special note of the
fact that defendants' fraud was "wilful," like the fraud in Janigan,
0 '
and implied that one of the circumstances justifying a restitutionary
measure was that defendants still held the stock and had not changed
their position materially since the time of the fraud.
2
But the courts are far from unanimous. In 
Kohler v. Kohler Co.,9
3
the court took the position that the plaintiff's recovery should be
86. Id. at 144.
87. The corporation went public shortly after plaintiffs sold, and its stock 
was listed
on the American Stock Exchange. Plaintiffs had each sold 500 shares 
at $20.00 per share.
or a total of $10,000 each. The stock subsequently split 34.6 for I and 4 
for Lso that
by the time of the decision, each 500-share block had turned into 69,200 
shares. Shortly
before that time, Gulf American was selling at 8, so total damages 
apparently
amounted to more than $1,000,000.
88. 283 F. Supp. at 146.
89. Id. at 147.
90. See note 109 infra.
91. 283 F. Supp. at 144.
92. Id. at 147.
93. 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), af'd., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). 
The District
Court's comments on damages were explicitly disapproved in 
Myzel and Baumel. 386
F.2d 718, 749 (1968); 283 F. Supp. 128, 145 (D. Md. 968).
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limited to his "actual damages," as measured by the out-of-pocket
rule. There, the plaintiff had voluntarily offered to sell his stock
to the corporation. In order to help him set a reasonable price, the
company's officers furnished him with information on its past earn-
ings and those of its competitors. He sold, and later, dissatisfied with
his bargain, brought suit under the Rule, charging that the informa.
tion had contained material misstatements and omissions. The dis-
trict court found for defendants on the merits, but it noted that
[p]laintiff could not recover damages in this action even if de-
fendants had violated their statutory or common-law duties of dis-
closure. Section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act .. . limits re-
covery to "actual damages on account of the act complained of"
"Actual damages" are to be computed under the federal "out-of-
pocket" rule applied in fraud actions, i.e., the difference between
the price received by the plaintiff and the real or actual value of
the stock at the date of the sale. Under this rule, a plaintiff is
entitled to recover what he has lost by the sale but may not re-
cover any actual or potential gain that was received by the
defendants. 94
The court's reasoning was that even if plaintiff were right and the
information furnished by the corporation was in fact misleading,
the difficulty of appraising the stock was such that it would have been
pure speculation to say that the price received was less than its "real
value."
Judge Wyatt of the Southern District of New York followed the
Kohler rule in Ross v. Licht0 5 There the insiders had purchased plain-
tiffs' stock for $120.00 per share without disclosing plans for a public
offering at $600.00. Shortly after the purchase but before the offering,
they sold similar shares to some friends for $300.00. Perhaps influ-
enced by the fact that the corporation had gone into bankruptcy by
the time the suit was brought, thus wiping out any profits defen-
dants might have made,9 6 the judge applied an out-of-pocket measure.
But he observed that "[a]bsent market value (as here), 'fair value' is
to be determined from all the pertinent circumstances both for a
reasonable time before the sale and after it."o The evidence indicated
that book value at the time of the sale was $204.20, but the court
awarded damages based on a fair value of $300.00, on the theory
that the price paid by friends of the insiders less than two weeks after
94. 208 F. Supp. at 825.
95. 263 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
96. Id. at 411-12.
97. Id. at 410.
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the sale could not have been greatly in excess of the value at the
time of the sale.98
In none of these cases did the court develop a measure of damages
that could honestly be characterized as remedial. In Speed, Jan igan
and Baumel, civil liability was clearly used as a penal device. This
does violence to the basic purpose of civil liability,
0  and it seems
particularly inappropriate when the Securites Exchange Act provides
specifically for criminal penalties00 and the SEC claims the author-
ity to compel disgorgement in an enforcement proceeding.
01 In
Kohler and Ross, the courts did seem to be concerned with approxi-
mating the seller's real loss, but the out-of-pocket measure can only
achieve that goal when the plaintiff would have sold his stock at
the end of whatever period is used for the hindsight estimation of
"fair value." The District Court applied a somewhat more sophis-
ticated measure in Myzel, but its instructions were confusing and the
decision was tainted with the List test of causation.
2. Framing an Appropriate Measure of Damages
In developing an appropriate standard for measuring damages in
active-market cases, it should be kept in mind that even after the
plaintiff has established that his sale was caused by the insider's
market activity, the insider's liability is still subject to two conditions.
First, the plaintiff has to establish that he actually suffered a loss.
Second, he has to demonstrate that his loss is compensable under the
Rule. An examination of the first problem suggests a measure of dam-
ages which an examination of the second tends to confirm.
The fact that an insider's presence in the market caused an in-
vestor to sell when he did is immaterial unless the investor would
otherwise have held on to his stock until after disclosure and eventu-
ally have sold it for more,102 But proof of the seller's probable con-
98. Id. at 411.
9A. See pp. 867-69 supra.
100. Section 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1964).
101. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839 (2d Cir. 1968).
102. Thus if a Texas Gulf ttockholdet ordered his broker to sll at thirty on April
1st, the order being good for that day only, and the stock reached thirty that day soley
because insiders were buying, the insiders dearly caused the sale. But if he would have
renewed that order on April 8th and the stock would then have: reached thirt), withiout
any help from the insiders, it seems unfair to charge the insiders with responsibility for
his failure to profit from the boom following the disclosure of the copper strike on
April 16th. Similarly, if he would have retained his stock until the following December.
when its price was back down to thirty again, his "loss," if it can be spoken of as such.
was Wholly unrelated to th6 insider's offense. In other words, if he would never have
cashed in on his paper profits, or if he would have sold but reinvested unwisely, so
that by the time of the suit he would have been no richer than he in fact was, it seems
inaccurate to say that the insiders caused him to "lose" soincthing of %alue.
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duct is hard to come by. In most cases, not even the seller has any
idea of what he would have done with the stock had he not sold when
he did. If investors as a class were characterized by scrupulous lion-
esty, a requirement that they prove causation of loss, as well as causa-
tion of sale, would probably bar recoveries altogether. Human nature
being what it is, the more likely result is a chorus of assurances that
a sale at any but the most propitious moment would have been tin-
thinkable.103
If the issue of damages is not to turn on the trier of fact's appraisal
of the seller's veracity, some sort of presumption of fact concerning his
probable conduct seems essential. But the difficulty of generalizing in
this area makes it hard to suggest a satisfactory one. On the one hand,
the law operates arbitrarily and inappropriately if it compels even
an admitted tortfeasor to pay for a "loss" that the plaintiff would
have suffered anyway. On the other, as the courts have pointed out,
it seems unduly harsh on the seller to deny recovery because of
problems of proof that the insider himself created. 04
Similar problems have arisen in other areas of the law, but no
adequate solution has yet been advanced. In some of the cases dis.
cussed above, the courts purported to rely on the Restatement of
Restitution, but the Restatement's "solution" simply rephrases the
same problem in different terms. Section 151 of the Restatement
provides that where the defendant gained possession of the plaintiff's
property by consciously tortious conduct, the plaintiff may recover
the value of the property at the time of the tort "or a higher value
if this is required to avoid injustice where the property has fluctu-
ated in value .... " In Comment c, the Reporter elaborates on the
latter measure:
Where the subject matter is of fluctuating value, and where the
person deprived of it might have secured a higher amount for it
had he not been so deprived, justice to him may require that the
measure of recovery be more than the value at the time of depriva-
tion .... In such cases the person deprived is entitled to be put
in substantially the position in which he would have been had
there not been the deprivation, and this may result in granting to
him an amount equal to the highest value reached by the subject
matter within a reasonable time after the tortious conduct. This
103. For example, see p. 882 supra. Theoretically, the plaintiff would have toshow, not only that he would have sold at the most propitious moment, but also that hewould have reinvested the proceeds profitably (or at least avoided a loss).104. See Taylor v. Janigan, 280 F. Supp. 858, 859 (D. Mass. 1964), ajy'd, 844 F.2d 781
(1st Cir. 1965).
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is done if he can prove that he probably would have made a sale
while the subject matter was at its highest point in value. 06
In active-market cases, the Restatement rule is of little if any assis-
tance. Ordinarily the seller will be unable to "prove" that he would
have sold at any specific time. This limits him to the "value" of the
stock at the time of the tort, and "value" is an ambiguous term. It
might stand for "market value," but that interpretation would re-
sult in denying recovery altogether when the plaintiff sold at market,
as would usually be the case with listed stocks. Alternatively, it might
mean "value" in the light of events subsequent to the sale-disclosure,
for instance. But that seems inconsistent with the Restatement's
treatment of the "reasonable time after" measure as a distinct rem-
edy. In any case, the Restatement gives no help in determining which
subsequent events might be relevant.
The Restatement of Torts takes a somewhat different position. Sec-
tion 927 provides that the victim of a fraudulent conversion of chat-
tels is entitled to "the exchange value of the subject matter or the
plaintiff's interest therein at the time and place of the conversion...
or a different value where that is necessary to give just compensa-
tion. .. ." The Comments note that
[i]f the subject matter of the conversion is a commodity which
has fluctuated in value, the owner is entitled to the highest value
which it reached in the market within a reasonable time after
he discovered or had reason to know of the conversion. This is an
equitable adjustment based on what it would have cost the de-
prived owner to purchase an equivalent amount of the commodity
and thereby avoid loss or retain a profit.... The fluctuations in
value before such time are ordinarily disregarded . . . , except
where the converter disposed of the subject matter during such
time. 06
In effect, the conversion measure presumes that absent any wrong-
doing by the defendant, the plaintiff would have retained the con-
verted property until he learned of the fraud. Although the presump-
tion obviously becomes less realistic as the liquidity of the property
in question increases, it seems reasonable that in cases where cer-
tainty is unattainable, the plaintiff should be given the benefit of the
doubt (assuming that the presumption is rebuttable).
The distinctive feature of the conversion measure is that it imposes
105. RESTAmNmxT OF REsrrrtUTON § 151, Comment c (1936).
106. RFSTATEMENT OF TORTs § 927, Comment e (1939).
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an upper limit on damages. Losses that the plaintiff suffered more
than a reasonable time after learning of the fraud are noncompensable.
It introduces a mitigation of damages element, and perhaps even a
notion of proximate cause, by taking account of the defrauded party's
ability to restore himself to something approximating his former
position once he discovers the fraud. This limitation is particularly
appropriate for insider trading cases, since Rule 1Ob-5 gives no
warrant for damages in excess of the "value" of the information with-
held. In tort law generally, a plaintiff must prove not only that the
defendant's conduct was in fact the cause of his loss, but also that
it was the proximate cause. The issue is generally framed in terms of
foreseeability. Theoretically, at least, the critical question is whether
or not the risk of injury and/or the identity of the plaintiff were
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the offense.
But a slightly different rule applies in cases of implied tort.
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited
act, or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for
an invasion of an interest of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to pro-
tect an interest of the other as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is in-
tended to protect; and
(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest
from a particular hazard, the invasion of the interest results from
that hazard; and
(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other
has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from main-
taining an action.10
7
The problem is to define the "interest" that Rule lOb-5 protects and
the "hazard" that the Rule was intended to protect it from. In part
the Rule protects investors from the threat to their investment posed
by a potential conflict of interest for corporate managers. But its mail
justification, and the one most frequently cited by the courts in private
actions, is that it ensures a "fair" stock market by giving all investors
equal access to relevant information and subjecting all traders to
"identical market risks."108
But if the Rule was intended primarily to prevent unfairness, the
seller's recovery should be limited to the gains that he was "unfairly"
107. RESrATEMENT OF ToRTs § 286 (1939); see note 22 supra. Subsection (a) poses no
problem since courts have unanimously agreed that the "intent" of Rule lOb-5 was to
protect individual investors from being defrauded. E.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
108. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968).
888
Vol. 78: 864, 1969
Insiders' Liability Under Rule 1Ob-5
deprived of. That means that he should be allowed to recover no
more than the "value" of the information withheld. To the extent
that the insider's profits are traceable to factors other than the effects
of that information, he earned them fairly by taking the risks of the
market just like any other investor. The seller did not. At worst,
damages in excess of the value of the inside information would nullify
the effects of the insider's superior foresight and market analysis.
At best, such damages would only shift windfall profits from the per-
son who took the risk to one who bore no risk at all.100 Yet return
without risk, albeit in a more vicious form, is exactly what the Rule
was supposed to prevent,
This implies that increases in a stock's price either before the date
of disclosure or after the market has finished digesting the news
should be excluded from the plaintiff's damages. Taken a step further,
however, this analysis can lead to an incorrect result.110 For it might
be thought that if the effects of extraneous occurrences between the
time of purchase and the time of "digestion" are to be wholy disre-
garded, the seller's damages should be measured by estimating what
effect disclosure would have had at the time of the purchase. The
fallacy of that position can best be illustrated by an example. Assume
that in Texas Gulf, shortages of both sulphur and copper caused their
prices to rise sharply between the date of an insider's purchase and
the date when the company disclosed its copper discovery. Under the
analysis suggested above, the insider would not be accountable for
the increment in the value of Texas Gulf stock traceable to the sul-
phur shortage. This might seem to imply that since the copper short-
age, which also occurred after his purchase, was responsible for part
of his profits, his liability should be reduced to reflect that as well.
However, insider trading consists not just in purchasing stock with
inside information, but also in retaining that stock until the in-
formation is disclosed. The insider's guilt becomes fixed only on the
date of disclosure."' Thus, by retaining his stock after the increase
109. Professor Painter notes that to permit a restitutionary measure of damages "is
to assume that, but for the lack of disclosure [List test], the seller would have continued
to hold his shares up to the time rescission is sought, and thus afford him a significant
speculative advantage during the period within whicli an action might be brought. He
holds, in short, a 'call' on the shares at the sale price until the statute of limitations
has run against him." W. PANTER, supra note 9, at 121. Restitutionary damages are
criticized as granting the seller an "unwarranted windfall" in Kennedy & Wander, Texas
Gulf Sulphur: A Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. LAw. 1057, 1073-74 (1965).
110. The writer is indebted to Richard D. Diamond for pointing this out.
111. Thus if an insider bought Texas Gulf in November, simply as a short.term
speculation, and sold it long before the Timmins discovery was disclosed, he might have
transgressed the letter of the law, but in no meaningful sense was he guilty of insider
trading.
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in copper prices became known, the insider in the example might
be said to have compounded his offense. It was just as unfair to ap-
propriate the increment in value traceable to the increase in the
price of copper as it was to appropriate the value which the undis-
closed information had at the time of purchase.
The real question, therefore, is what value the market in fact
attributed to the information withheld. This can only be determined
empirically. The trier of fact will have to determine (1) how long
the market took to absorb the information, and (2) what portion of
the rise in price during that period was properly assignable to its
disclosure. The result is a measure of damages similar, but not identi-
cal, to the Restatement conversion measure. The Restatement makes
a converter liable for the value of the converted property within a
reasonable time after the fraud is discovered. The rule suggested here
would substitute the date of disclosure for the date when the fraud
was discovered, and a "reasonable time" would be whatever time
the market took to evaluate and reflect the information disclosed.
Like the Restatement, the rule suggested here imposes a definite
ceiling on the seller's damages: the value of the information with-
held. But there seems to be no good reason for making it a minimum
as well. The insider should be able to show not only that the seller
would have sold before disclosure anyway," 2 but also that the plain-
tiff would have retained the stock after disclosure and ultimately have
lost his paper profits." 3 It seems highly unlikely that the latter
argument would ever succeed in an active-market case. However, in
a case like Ross v. Licht,"4 where the stock was closely held and the
issuer suffered major reverses shortly after the good news was dis-
closed, it seems quite conceivable that the seller would in fact have
lost his paper profits. In short, then, the suggested measure would
limit the seller's damages to the amount of his actual loss or the
value of the undisclosed information, whichever is the lesser.
This measure has its unattractive aspects. Cases will arise where
the insider's violation in fact caused an innocent investor to lose a
windfall, and it seems distasteful to let the insider keep it. Besides,
a more liberal measure of damages would undoubtedly enhance the
Rule's effectiveness as a deterrent to insider trading. But similar cir-
cumstances have existed in other cases without altering the result.
112. See p. 885 & note 102 supra.
113. Id. Once again, the same analysis would apply (in theory) if the seller would
have sold after disclosure, but would have lost the profits by the time of the suit.
114. 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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In Gorris v. Scott,115 a leading case in the development of the im-
plied tort doctrine, the plaintiff argued that a statute requiring that
sheep being transported by ship be kept in separate pens gave rise to
a private right of action for losses suffered when unpenned sheep were
washed overboard. The court found for the defendant, since the
legislature enacted the law to protect against death by disease, not
by drowning. The carrier's violation caused an innocent party's
loss, and a judgment for the plaintiff would certainly have increased
the statute's effectiveness as a deterrent to unsanitary practices. Still,
the plaintiff lost, and Gorris is good law today." 6
The law does have a strong policy against letting tortfeasors profit
from their wrongs. But in active-market cases, at least, the losses that
the insider caused will bear no logical relationship to the amount of
his profits, and a measure of damages based on the concept of unjust
enrichment would simply be unworkable. The weapons already
furnished to the SEC by the 1934 Act are sufficient to deprive in-
siders of their gains and deter future violations. Civil liability is
supposed to be remedial, not penal, and there seems to be no good
reason to create an exception for insider trading cases.
VILLIAi HENRY NAVIN
115. [1874] L.R. 9 Ex. 125.
116. See IV. PRossxn, supra note 18, at 197 n.29.
t A.B. 1966, University of Notre Dame; LL.B. 1969, Yale University. This Comment
was originally prepared for the Senior Studies Program, Yale Law School.
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